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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REMOTE SENSING
SATELLITE SURVEILLANCE IN WARRANTLESS
ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTIONS
INTRODUCTION
T HE last few decades have seen an incredible expansion in environ-
mental legislation.' In order to enforce environmental regulations
effectively, Congress has included a "right of entry" in statutes which
allows governmental investigators access to private facilities.2 Although
the Supreme Court has held that aerial photography is included in an
inspector's investigatory power, the Court questioned the legality of sat-
ellite surveillance.3 In evaluating the constitutionality of aerial photogra-
phy, the Court analyzed five factors: the type of the place under
surveillance;4 the obtrusiveness of the physical surveillance;5 the degree
of enhancement provided by the sensor;6 the availability of the equip-
1. See Joseph C. Sweeney, Protection of the Environment in the United States, 1
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 1 (1989).
2. See Clean Water Act of 1977 § 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1988); Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
§ 104(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA) § 3007, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (1988); Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of
1979 § 211(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1808(c) (1988); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA) § 9, 7 U.S.C. § 136g(a) (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
§ 11, 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1988). Cases involving administrative searches/investigations
conducted under environmental statutes include: EPA v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,
836 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930
(W.D. Wash. 1990); Outboard Marine Corp. v. EPA, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), va-
cated, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986). See generally Steven T. Wax, Symposium on Waste Manage-
ment Law and Policy. Related Issue: the Fourth Amendment, Administrative Searches and
the Loss of Liberty, 18 ENVTL. L. 911, 915 n.29 (1988).
3. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
In the instant case, two additional Fourth Amendment claims are presented:
whether the common-law "curtilage" doctrine encompasses a large industrial
complex such as Dow's, and whether photography employing an aerial map-
ping camera is permissible in this context. Dow argues that an industrial plant,
even one occupying 2,000 acres, does not fall within the "open fields" doctrine
of Oliver v. United States, but rather is an "industrial curtilage" having constitu-
tional protection equivalent to that of the curtilage of a private home. Dow
further contends that any aerial photgaphy of this "industrial Curtilage" in-
trudes upon its reasonable expectations of privacy.
4. Id. at 235. (citations omitted).
5. Here, the EPA was not employing some unique sensory device that, for ex-
ample, could penetrate the walls of buildings and record conversations in Dow's
plants, offices or laboratories, but rather a conventional, albeit precise, commer-
cial camera commonly used in mapmaking. The government asserts it has not
yet enlarged the photographs to any significant degree ....
Id. at 238.
6. It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of private
property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally
available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally
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ment;7 and the existing legal protections against invasion of a business'
privacy to uncover trade secrets.' When these factors are applied to re-
mote sensing satellite sensors, there is no reason to create a legal distinc-
tion between aerial photography and remote sensing satellite
surveillance.
This Note examines the constitutionality of satellite surveillance in
warrantless environmental inspections. Part I describes the constitu-
tional framework for warrantless governmental inspections. Part II ex-
amines Dow Chemical Co. v. United States9 and argues that satellite
surveillance is not likely to intrude on activities protected by the Fourth
Amendment. Part III concludes that Remote Sensing Satellite Surveil-
lance is a proper investigatory tool under the "right of entry" provisions
in environmental legislation.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR WARRANTLESS
ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects the rights of an
individual to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures."" ° The
traditional view of this amendment is limited to a person's individual
home, his personal papers and effects, and the government's physical en-
try into the home."' The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment's reach to protect people in areas outside of the home such
proscribed absent a warrant. But the photographs here are not so revealing of
intimate details as to raise the constitutional concerns. Although they undoubt
edly give the EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain
limited to an outline of the facility's buildings and equipment. The mere fact
that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not
give rise to constitutional problems.
Id. at 238.
7. An electronic device to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record
confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other trade secrets would raise
very different and far more serious questions; other protections such as trade
secret laws are available to protect commercial activities from private surveil-
lance by competitors.
Id. at 239.
8. "No trade secret law cited to us by Dow proscribes the use of aerial photography
of Dow's facilities for law enforcement proposes, let alone photography for private pur-
poses, unrelated to competition such as mapmaking or simple amateur snapshots." Id. at
239 n.6.
9. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
10. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment in its entirety states: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
11. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 589 (1980); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312
(1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971), overruled by Washing-
ton v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 137 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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as the curtilage of the home 2 or place of business.' 3 The scope of free-
dom afforded at the home, however, is differentiated from commercial
property and searches are not necessarily infringed by warrantless ad-
ministrative inspections.' 4 With the advent of modem technology, the
Court has had to refine the scope of protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. '5
In 1967, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality
of warrantless administrative searches. In Camara v. Municipal Court of
San Francisco,16 the Court overruled Frank v. Maryland 17 to the extent
that it permitted warrantless administrative searches without some ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement. The Court rejected the notion that
searches under the regulatory scheme were reasonable and that a warrant
was not required.18 The Court held that inspectors need not show prob-
able cause that a violation exists, but rather they must show a reasonable
government interest to justify a warrant requirement. 19
The Supreme Court drastically restricted the availability of warrant-
less administrative searches in See v. City of Seattle.2" By applying the
holding in Camara, the Court held that administrative entry upon por-
tions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may be
conducted only with a warrant.2 ' In both Camara and See, the Court
held that in order to obtain an administrative warrant, the official need
not show probable cause that a violation of the applicable regulation has
occurred; he need only present evidence relating to the purpose of the
regulatory statute.22
12. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
13. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
14. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1986), Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (electronic device); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (image-magnifying aerial photogra-
phy); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705
(1984) (electronic tracking device); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (artificial illumi-
nation); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (electronic device).
16. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
17. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). This was the first Supreme Court case to consider the valid-
ity of warrantless regulatory inspections. In Frank, a health inspector was investigating
complaints of rodent infestation in Frank's neighborhood. At the rear of the house the
inspector found strong evidence of rat infestation. When the inspector tried to enter the
house, Frank refused. The inspector returned with two policemen. After reinspecting
the exterior of the house, he then swore out a warrant for Frank's arrest. Frank appealed
his conviction, claiming that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. In af-
firming Frank's conviction, the Court held that Fourth Amendment protection does not
extend to administrative searches. Frank v. Maryland was subsequently overruled by
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
18. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530-32.
19. Id. at 539.
20. 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
21. See, 387 U.S. at 543. "[I]f a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contem-
plated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant."
22. See, 387 U.S. at 543-545.
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A. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement for Administrative
Investigations
There are exceptions to the administrative warrant requirement for
governmental investigations.23 For purposes of Remote Sensing Satellite
Surveillance in warrantless environmental inspections, the pertinent ex-
ceptions are the open fields and plain view doctrines.24
The open fields and plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement
are similarly applicable to administrative searches as they are to the main
body of Fourth Amendment law.25 Both exceptions are pertinent to the
discussion of remote sensing in environmental inspections. In order to
understand these exceptions, it is necessary to discuss the seminal case
which defined "constitutionally protected area"26 under the Fourth
Amendment.
In Katz v. United States,27 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority
stated that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places (or
areas).2" The Court held that the electronic eavesdropping was an
unconstitutional search because the agents had not obtained a search
warrant. 29 Justice Harlan's concurrence has become a two-part test
upon which lower courts rely,3° and the Supreme Court ultimately
23. An exception to the administrative warrant requirement was approved by the
Supreme Court in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) and
Biswell v. United States, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). This exception is justified based on the
owner's implicit waiver of Fourth Amendment rights by choosing to own a business that
is "pervasively regulated". In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the rule was
limited because the Court emphasized that the pervasive regulation exception was not a
general rule. See also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), (automobile industry);
Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984);
United States v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 667 F.2d 510 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1007 (1982) (mining); Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072 (7th
Cir. 1983) aff'd sub nom, Rush v. Obledo, 756 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1985) (family day
care); United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982) (drug manufacturers); United States v. Tsuda
Maru, 470 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Alaska 1979) (fishing).
24. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (open
fields exception); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view exception).
25. See generally Theodore Fishman, Technologically Enhanced Visual Surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment: Sophistication, Availability and the Expectation of Privacy, 26
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315 (1988).
26. This doctrine defined a constitutionally protected area as being an area that would
require a physical invasion or trespass in order to pass constitutional muster. See infra
note 32 and accompanying text.
27. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was convicted in federal court on a charge of wagering
information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston. Evidence was pro-
duced at trial by FBI agents, who had attached an eavesdropping device to the exterior of
the public phone booth.
28. Id. at 351.
29. Id. at 347.
30. United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976); Government of Virgin Is-
lands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969).
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adopted.3" Harlan states:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhib-
ited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reason-
able." Thus a man's home is for most purposes, a place where he ex-
pects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the "plain view" would not be protected against being overheard, for
the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be
unreasonable.
32
The plain view doctrine states that an officer (or administrative agent)
may seize evidence which is in his/her immediate visual sight a.3  As tech-
nology has become more sophisticated, what constitutes "plain view" has
been scrutinized. 34 In deciding whether technologically-enhanced visual
surveillance is a search, the Court has considered many factors including
the extent to which the equipment enhanced officers' natural senses, and
the availability of such equipment to the general public.
The Supreme Court first considered the Fourth Amendment implica-
tion of enhanced visual surveillance in the 1927 decision of United States
v. Lee. "5 The Court held that the use of a search light to enable officials to
see contraband did not infringe upon the defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment rights, since the search light illuminated what was already in "plain
sight" of the officer.36 The same rationale was expanded in State v.
Denton,37 where a police officer used a night scope (infra-red spectrum
band) which was located on a public navigable waterway. The Court
held that since the night scope magnifies what the viewer could see with
the naked eye, it was not an unconstitutional search.3 8
In Goldman v. United States,39 the Court had held that the use of an
electronic listening device did not constitute a search if the surveillance
was not accompanied by physical trespass or physical intrusion. But in
31. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979).
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
33. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
34. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238
(1979); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128 (1978); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States v.
Donoven, 429 U.S. 4132 (1977); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974);
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); United States v. United States Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
35. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
36. Id.
37. 387 So. 2d 578 (La. 1980).
38. Id. at 579.
39. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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Katz,40 the Court held that the use of eaves-dropping equipment in a
public telephone booth was a search; the Court expressly disapproved of
the Goldman rule. 4'
In Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,42 the plain
view exception was adapted to administrative inspections. In Western
Alfalfa, a state official entered on company's land to view the smoke from
company's chimneys and to make an opacity test to measure air pollu-
tion. The Court implicitly approved of the plain view exception in ad-
ministrative searches.43
The most current case to use the plain view doctrine in analyzing ae-
rial photography is Dow Chemical Co. v. United States." In Dow, a very
sophisticated camera was used to establish environmental violations.
The Court held that the use of the camera was not violative of the Fourth
Amendment because the pictures were taken in plain view of an open
area of the plant.45
The early search and seizure decisions focused on the "constitutionally
protected areas" approach. The "open fields" doctrine can be viewed as
an application of this approach. In Hester v. United States,46 the Court
denied Fourth Amendment protections to areas designated as open fields.
In Katz, the majority rejected the constitutionally protected areas ap-
proach, but in Harlan's concurring opinion, the open fields doctrine ap-
proach was preserved. 47 These two tests, "constitutionally protected
areas" and "reasonable expectations of privacy" were modified in Oliver
v. United States4" using the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
developed in Katz. The Court held that the expectation of privacy in
open fields is not an expectation that "society recognizes as reason-
able."49 The Court considered the open fields doctrine of Hester to be
consistent with Katz.5 0
The Supreme Court addressed aerial surveillance and the open fields
doctrine in California v. Ciraolo5" and Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States. 2 In Ciraolo, the Court held that a warrantless overflight from an
40. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id. at 358-59.
42. 416 U.S. 861 (1974). The lower court held that Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967),
and See, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), required a warrant, but the Court found those cases inap-
plicable because the inspector was not in the plant inspecting the premises, equipment,
people or files. Air Pollution Variance Board, 416 U.S. at 864-65.
43. Id.
44. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46. 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, a revenue agent spotted the defendant with bootleg
whiskey. The defendant threw the jug into a nearby field. The agent found the broken
jug in the field and found that it did contain whiskey.
47. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
48. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
49. Id. at 171.
50. Id. at 173.
51. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
52. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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altitude of 1000 feet, which enabled the investigator to identify marijuana
by naked eye observation, was a constitutional search. Also, the Court
clarified the open fields doctrine to include any aerial observation which
the police were capable of surveying as long as the public could see the
same activities.53
In Dow, the Court held that viewing the open areas of an industrial
complex with the use of aerial surveillance and precision aerial mapping
was equivalent to an open field in which an individual may not legiti-
mately demand privacy. 4 In its discussion of the commercial mapping
camera used to take the photographs, the Court stated "that surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public such as satellite technol-
ogy might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."55
II. Dow CHEMICAL CO. V. UNITED STATES
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 6 aerial photography was held
not to be a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. If the factors
used to evaluate the use of aerial photography in warrantless environ-
mental inspections are applied to satellite technology for that use, no
legal distinction exists between these technologies.
A. Facts
The United States Environmental Protection Agency hired a private
firm to take aerial photographs of the Dow Chemical plant in Midland,
Michigan. A camera worth $22,000 was used to take color photographs
from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet. The photographs could
detail equipment, pipes, and power lines as small as one half inch in di-
ameter. The Court held that even though Dow had an expectation of
privacy, the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex
from navigable airspace was simply not a search prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment." The factors used by the Court to evaluate aerial
photography were the open fields doctrine, the intrusiveness of the sen-
sor, the degree of sensory enhancement, and the existing legal protections
for trade secrets.58 Each of these factors will be discussed, then applied
to remote sensing satellite surveillance.
B. The Open Fields and Satellite Surveillance
In the Court's view, Dow's industrial facility was more like an open
field than a home. Dow was not protected by the Fourth Amendment
53. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207.
54. Dow, 476 U.S. at 228.
55. Id. at 238.
56. 476 U.S. 227.
57. Id. at 229.
58. Jim Talbett, Satellite Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, American Society
for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 209-16 (1987).
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for warrantless inspections59 since airflights are a common occurrence
and Dow did not take any steps to protect observation from the air.
Both satellite surveillance and aerial photography operate by recording
reflected energy from the surface."° One difference between them, how-
ever, is the altitude of the remote sensor in the satellite which is higher
than that of aerial photography. In open field recording situations where
the sensor can delineate the outline of private buildings, there should be
no Fourth Amendment restrictions.6 Although satellite sensors un-
doubtedly give the EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views,
they remain limited to an outline of the facility's buildings and equip-
ment similar to aerial photography. The mere fact that human vision is
enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give rise to
constitutional problems. Thus, it is not reasonable to distinguish be-
tween aerial photography or remote sensing devices that record the activ-
ities in open fields.
C. Intrusiveness of the Remote Sensor
The Court noted that the aerial photography used in Dow could not
penetrate walls and record confidential information.62 Sensors using in-
frared could detect certain materials behind walls or underground.63 In
Katz, the Court recognized that due to the rapidly advancing surveillance
technology, a search could violate the Fourth Amendment without a
physical trespass.'M
Satellite surveillance does not involve a physical invasion of the prop-
erty and is relatively unobtrusive; 65 unlike the eavesdropping device used
in Katz. The Court in Ciraolo also noted the unobtrusiveness of the air-
plane flight in navigable airspace as being one of the deciding factors in
permitting the flight without violation of the Fourth Amendment.66
Since Dow, it will have to be shown that satellite remote sensing is more
like eavesdropping than aerial photography in order for it to be violative
of the Fourth Amendment.
59. We conclude that the open areas of an industrial plant complex with numer-
ous plant structures spread over an area of 2,000 acres are not analogous to the
"curtilage" of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance; [footnote omitted]
such an industrial complex is more comparable to an open field and as such it is
open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in the public
airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the area for the reach of
cameras.
Dow, 476 U.S. at 227.
60. See infra notes 71-92 and accompanying text.
61. Dow, 476 U.S. at 238.
62. Id. at 238.
63. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
65. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text,
66. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
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D. Sensory Enhancement
The Court in Dow considered the degree of enhancement the sensor
provides. The Court in Dow found photographs that showed very intri-
cate details of pipes to be permissible.67 The amplification size available
from the American LANDSAT System (30 M) and the French (SPOT)
system (10 M) would not be able to produce images as revealing as the
ones the Dow Court found permissible.6"
Also pertinent is the constitutional problem of electronically gathered
data that cannot be perceived by the human senses. "The difference be-
tween the human eye and the satellite sensing system is that humans see
all visible bands simultaneously, whereas satellites view the earth in sepa-
rate spectral bands."69 It should be noted that enhanced surveillance
may be permissible only in analyzing the exterior of buildings and not
within private areas. Thus, like aerial photography, enhanced satellite
surveillance which does not penetrate the curtilage of the building would
be constitutionally permissible.
E. Availability of Satellite Surveillance Equipment
The Court in Dow noted that the camera used for aerial photography
was a camera that was commonly used for mapmaking purposes.70 The
Court, however, did distinguish between the availability of aerial photog-
raphy to the public and satellite surveillance. 7 ' The Court reasoned that
because the public does not have access to the satellites, the expectation
of privacy from satellite observation was greater than that of aerial
observation.
This distinction is not valid because images produced by satellites such
as LANDSAT and SPOT are available to anyone. 7' Furthermore, in
1984 Congress passed the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act
of 1984 which privatized the satellite business.73 Thus, it is possible to
order specific images of any area in the world, a person's expectation to
be free from surveillance is diminished. 4
67. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 238 (1986).
68. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
69. NASA, LANDSAT BULLETIN 25 (1988).
70. Dow, 476 U.S. at 235.
71. Id. at 235.
72. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
73. Landsat Commercialization Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4201 - 4292 (1988). Sec-
tion 4203 provides that "it shall be the policy of the United States that civilian
unenhanced remote sensing data be made available to all potential users on a 'nondis-
criminatory' basis." Id. § 4203. The legislative history defines "nondiscriminatory" as
"without preference, bias, or any arrangement that favors any purchaser or class of pur-
chasers." H.R. REP. No. 98, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1017.
74. France successfully launched the first commercial remote sensing satellite SPOT,
in February, 1986. The Spot-Image Corporation has concluded numerous agreements for
the sale of its data, and even the United States Pentagon makes use of its services.
SPOTS tariffs for a single MSS frame are about $155 for a black and white print and $410
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F. Trade Secrets
The final factor emphasized in Dow was the invasion of a business'
privacy to uncover trade secrets. The Court in Dow held that trade se-
cret laws do not proscribe legitimate aerial photograph's applications.75
In Dow, the government's objective was not to engage in industrial espio-
nage, but rather to enforce environmental regulations.76 Also, federal
laws, protect commercial surveillance in terms of unfair competition."
The legitimate use of remote sensing for research purposes generates
great benefits for society's right to know, and society's interest in enforc-
ing environmental laws. In making the determination of what is reason-
able, the Court must balance the public interest against the level of
intrusion into individual privacy.
When these factors are applied to remote sensing satellite surveillance
it is unlikely that this surveillance technique would intrude upon the ac-
tivity protected by the Fourth Amendment. Since remote sensing satel-
lite information would be cost-effective and an excellent investigatory
tool for environmental protection, its use should be constitutional for
warrantless environmental inspections.79
III. REMOTE SENSING AND WARRANTLESS ENVIRONMENTAL
INSPECTIONS UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY'S RIGHT OF ENTRY
Recent environmental legislation has granted governmental investiga-
tory units a "right of entry" to facilities. Under this right of entry, in-
spectors have broad investigatory powers to conduct searches, take
samples, inspect equipment or records without obtaining a search
warrant. "
Remote Sensing may be a powerful investigatory tool even in situa-
tions where its output does not conform to regulatory standards, thus
preventing it from use as evidence. The legal question that arises, how-
ever, is whether remote sensing is available to the Environmental Protec-
for a color print. See generally EDWARD BINKOWSKI, SATELLITE INFORMATION SYS-
TEMS 64 (1988).
75. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231- 33 (1986).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 234 at n.2. Dow's fears that the EPA might disclose trade secrets revealed
in these photographs appears adequately addressed by federal law prohibiting such dis-
closures. See generally Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1988); Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1988).
78. Talbett, supra note 58, at 209-16.
79. See generally Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion - A
Technical Memorandum (Washington D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-
ment, OTA-TM-ISC-20, March 1984).
80. See Clean Water Act of 1977 § 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1988); CERCLA
§ 104(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (1988); RCRA § 3007, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (1988); Haz-
ardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 § 211(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1808(c) (1988); FIFRA
§ 9, 7 U.S.C. § 136g(a) (1988); TSCA § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1988).
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tion Agency as an investigatory tool under this "right of entry" without
violating the Fourth Amendment.
A. Right of Entry under the Clean Air Act"'
The right of entry for site inspection in the Clean Air Act is authorized
in Section 114(a) which states that the "Administrator or his authorized
representative, upon presentation of his credentials shall have a right of
entry to, or through any premises of such person or in which any records
required to be maintained . "...82 The legislative history provides that
this section authorizes entry of buildings, facilities and monitoring equip-
ment for purposes of setting standards and enforcing them.83 In analyz-
ing section 114 of the Clean Air Act, the Supreme Court stated in Dow
that
Congress vests [in the Environmental Protection Agency] with en-
forcement and investigatory authority, it is not necessary to identify
explicitly each and every technique that may be used in the course of
executing the statutory mission .... Regulatory or enforcement au-
thority generally carries with it all modes of inquiry and investigation
traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority granted....
Section 114(a), however, appears to expand, not restrict EPA's general
powers to investigate.84
The Court further stated that the "EPA, as a regulatory and enforce-
ment agency, needs no explicit statutory provision to employ methods of
observation commonly available to the public at large."85 Since remote
satellite information is available to the public, the EPA should be al-
lowed to use remote sensing satellite technology as an enforcement
tool.86
B. Remote Sensing Applications in Environmental Law Enforcement
Remote Sensing, broadly defined, "refers to any technique of imaging
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988).
82. Clean Air Act, § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1988).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1970) reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356, 5380.
84. 476 U.S. 227, 233-234 (1986).
85. Id. at 234.
86. It has been argued that it is questionable whether many of the federal environ-
mental statutes containing a "right of entry" are constitutionally adequate. Broad inspec-
tion schemes are constitutionally suspect when applied to industries that are not
pervasively regulated. See also Wax, supra note 2. Further constitutional restrictions
were placed on warrantless inspections in New York v. Burger 482 U.S. 691 (1987). The
Court held that the Mine Safety and Health Act, was constitutional and that a warrant-
less search of a closely regulated industry was reasonable. The Court held that three
criteria must be met in order for a warrantless inspection to be deemed "reasonable".
First, there must be a "substantial" government interest; second, the inspections must be
necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and third, the inspection program must "in
terms of the certainty and regularity of its application provide a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant." Id. at 692.
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objects without the sensor being in direct contact with the object or scene
itself."" Aerial photographs are one of the most commonly used prod-
ucts of remote sensing."8 Camera stations on airplanes or satellites pro-
vide millispectral imagery for study which is beyond the range of human
vision, hence the term "remote sensing" was coined. 9
There are three categories of remote sensing end products. "Photo-
graphic images" are produced by directly recording on photographic film
data received by sensors. "Reconstructed images" requires computer
processing or some other form of data manipulation. "Enhanced
images" are presented in the form of statistical tables or computer- gen-
erated charts, and bear a resemblance to photographs, but in actuality
are quite distinct.9"
Remote sensing satellites are designed specifically to collect data of the
earth's environment.9 Landsats are equipped with three basic systems
for gathering and transmitting data through remote sensing techniques:
Three Retrun Bean Vidicon (RBV); the MultiSpectral Scanner (MSS);
and the Thematic Mapper (TM).92
C. Remote Sensing Capabilities in Detection of Pollution
Because of a remote sensor's ability to obtain a synoptic view, ecologi-
cal and industrial phenomena can be monitored frequently. The use of
the spectral bands can prove quite valuable in detecting pollution. This
involves the recording and analyzing of electromagnetic energy from visi-
ble light, infrared radiation, microwave radiation, and all other forms of
87. INTRODUCTION TO REMOTE SENSING OF THE ENVIRONMENT, 5 (Benjamin F.
Richardson, Jr. 2d ed. 1985).
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id.
90. Howard A. Latin, Remote Sensing Evidence and Environmental Law 64 CAL. L.
REV. 1300, 1317 (1976).
91. See NASA Landsat Bulletin (1988). The first remote sensing satellite was the
Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS 1), later named Landsat 1. There were
three independent cameras that viewed a ground scene of approximately with a resolution
of 80 meters. ERTS 1 malfunctioned after 130 satellite orbits. Landsat 2 was launched in
1975; this satellite was very similar to Landsat I. In 1978, significant improvements were
made in Landsat 3 including a resolution of 40 meters. Landsat 2 ceased operation in
February 1982. The second generation of Landsat programs began with the launch of the
Landsat 4. Landsat 4 had some problems in 1982, which led to the launch of Landsat 5
in 1985. Landsats 4 and 5 circle the Earth every 98.9 minutes in a nearly polar orbit, 438
miles high.
92. The RBV photographs the surface of the Earth in three different spectra: red,
green and infrared. The MSS collects data by continually scanning the earth recording
radiation in four different spectral bands. The TM images an area of 30 meters using
seven spectral bands. Besides the RBV and the MSS/TM, another essential system was
at work on the Landsat satellites. The Data Collection System (DCS) transmits data to
central receiving stations for analysis. The Landsat system is now a privately owned joint
venture called Eosat. The European Space Agency (ESA) has developed an expendable
launch vehicle called ARIANE; its first remote sensing payload launched in 1986 offers
images which have a resolution of 30 meters. Id.
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wave-propagated energy.93 Remote sensing in spectral bands other than
the visible light ranges, offer the most significant benefits, but some infor-
mation derived from historic photographs proved valuable in analyzing
the physical environment of landfills, for example, in leachate
contamination. 9
4
The infrared spectrum runs from the bottom of the visible spectrum.
It is divided into two major regions: the visible infrared (near-infrared)
and the thermal infrared (far-infrared). Near-infrared wavelengths are
largely absorbed by water, but reflected by land. 95 This differentiation
makes near-infrared sensing a valuable tool for the detection of unau-
thorized land fill operations.96 The thermal infrared band which detects
radiation may indicate the presence of unauthorized discharges: effluents
containing radiation or thermal plumes.97
The radio spectrum begins at the bottom of the infrared and extends
all the way down to a few kilohertz. It can be divided further into VHF,
UHF, and microwave frequencies. 98 Active sensors such as radar can
image the Earth uninterrupted which is crucial to the observation of oil
spills.99 Landsat's ability to detect pollution was used to reveal a chemi-
cal discharge from a paper mill into Lake Champlain, dumping of indus-
trial wastes from barges into New York Bight, municipal waste disposal
in the ocean by New York City, and strip-mining damage in Southeast-
ern Ohio."°°
There have been increased demands placed on environmental agencies.
The type of information needed by these agencies can be efficiently and
appropriately obtained by using Remote Sensing techniques.1"' The
EPA has devoted considerable effort to increase compliance with regula-
tory standards and remote sensing is an integral part of its investigative
93. JON ERICKSON, EXPLORING EARTH FROM SPACE, 53 (1981).
94. See Donald Erb, Analysis of Landfills with Historic Airphotos, 47 PHOTOGRAM-
METRIC ENGINEERING AND REMOTE SENSING 1363-69 (1981).
95. See id.
96. See generally John Garfalo, Solid Waste and Remote Sensing, PHOTOGRAMMET-
RIC ENGINEERING AND REMOTE SENSING 45-59 (1974); Jon Stohr, Remote Sensing In-
vestigations at a Hazardous Waste Landfill, 53 PHOTOGRAMMETRIC ENGINEERING AND
REMOTE SENSING, 1555-63 (1987).
97. See generally Izi Veziroglu, Remote Sensing Applied to Thermal Pollution, RE-
MOTE SENSING ENERGY-RELATED STUDIES 303-34 (1975).
98. ERICKSON, supra note 93, at 58 (1981).
99. Sensing in a number of spectral bands has proved useful in the detection of oil
spills, and in fact, that application is among the best recognized of present remote sensing
capabilities. Howard A. Latin, Remote Sensing Evidence and Environmental Law, 64
CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1342 n.127 (1976).
100. NASA, Landsat Bulletin, 23 (1988).
101. See generally Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion - A
Technical Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology As-
sessment, OTA-TM-ISC-20, March 1984);. (Table 15 examines existing legislation which
requires monitoring including the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988)); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988); Hazardous Waste Management Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29
(1988); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)).
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arsenal.' 02 The Landsat Commercialization Act provides that other fed-
eral agencies are authorized and encouraged to conduct research and de-
velopment of the use of remote sensing in fulfillment of their authorized
missions, using funds appropriated for such purposes. °3 Investigatory
applications include detection of concealed effluent outlets, the identifica-
tion of air pollution sources either directly, through sensing emission
plumes, or by imaging the resulting deterioration of nearby vegetation,
detection of irrigation violations, and the monitoring of oceandumping. '04
CONCLUSION
Environmental protection has become one of the most pertinent issues
of our time. Congress has expressed the desire to address pollution in the
United States by enacting powerful legislation to force businesses to take
responsibility for industrial pollutants. In this new legislation the EPA
was granted a "right of entry" to inspect businesses for environmental
violations.
In Dow Chemical v. EPA, the constitutionality of satellite surveillance
was questioned by the Supreme Court. In reviewing the history of the
Fourth Amendment protections in administrative searches, and the tech-
nological advances in surveillance equipment the Court has adopted a
two-fold test regarding Fourth Amendment protections. Since it is no
longer reasonable to assume that remote sensing satellite surveillance
does not occur, and the data from the satellites are generally available to
the public, businesses can no longer rely on the Fourth Amendment to
shield them from standards imposed by environmental regulations. Also,
the Supreme Court analysis of aerial photography as presented in Dow
when applied to remote sensing satellite surveillance presents no legal
difficulties. Therefore, the use of remote sensing satellite surveillance as a
means of investigating environmental law violations should not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
Karen Geer
102. See generally Rough Terrain Diffusion Model 40 C.F.R. Parts 51-52 (1988). EPA
does not intend to-preclude the use of remote sensing devices to directly measure wind
speed and direction of prime transport height.
103. Landsat Commercialization Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 4261 (1984).
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